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546 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW 
REMEDIE8 OF LESSEE IN NEBRASKA WHEN DEMISED 
PREMISES ARE IN POSSESSION OF A WRONGFUL OCCUPIER 
Normally a lessee encounters few if any legal difficulties in 
gaining possession of the leased premises on the date his term 
begins. If, however, a prior tenant or other person in possession 
prevents the lessee from taking possession, the latter must bring 
an action against either the lessor or the occupier to obtain relief. 
The purpose of this article is to examine the remedies available 
in Nebraska to the lessee who seeks (1) to obtain possession of 
the demised premises and (2) to obtain damages for the time he 
was denied possession. 
I. Remedies To Gain Possession 
A. EJECTMENT 
The usual remedy of a lessee to gain possession of the leased 
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premises from a wrongful occupier is ejectment. This action as 
developed at common law and modified in most states by statute 
is based on the right of the lessee to possession of the premises. 
It is generally agreed that ejectment will lie in favor of the lessee 
against a wrongful occupier without an entry on the demised 
premises by the lessee.1 
In Nebraska a plaintiff bringing the statutory action of eject-
ment2 must show that he possesses a legal estate in the premises, 
that he is entitled to possession, and that the defendant is unlaw-
fully keeping him out of possession.3 A lessee is a proper party 
to bring the action.4 
B. FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER 
At common law this remedy was available to regain posses-
sion of the premises from one who had forcibly entered and ejected 
the plaintiff. The cause of action was based on the wrongful in-
terference with the plaintiff's possession by the use of physical 
force. In this action the question of title or right of possession 
was not involved and could not be tried. It was immaterial in 
what capacity the plaintiff had been in possession.0 In its origi-
nal form the action had to be sustained by evidence of actual pos-
session in the plaintiff at the time of the entry.6 
In Nebraska the common law action has been enlarged by 
statute.7 The gist of the plaintiff's case can be simply that the 
1 Ewert v. Robinson, 289 Fed. 740 (8th Cir. 1923). See Note, L.R.A. 
(n.s.) 54, 56 (1918A). 
2 Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 25-2124-25-2128 (Reissue 1948). 
3 Reams v. Sinclair, 97 Neb. 542, 150 N.W. 826 (1915); Bridenbaugh 
v. Bryant, 79 Neb. 329, 112 N.W. 571 (1907); Dale v. Hunneman, 12 
Neb. 221, 10 N.W. 711 (1881); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-2124 (Reissue 1948) 
provides, " ... in an action for the recovery of real property, it shall be 
sufficient if the plaintiff states in his petition that he has a legal estate 
therein, and is entitled to the possession thereof, describing the same, and 
that the defendant unlawfully keeps him out of the possession. It shall 
not be necessary to state how the plaintiff's estate or ownership is de-
rived." 
4Dale v. Hunneman, 12 Neb. 221, 10 N.W. 711 (1881). 
5 Emsley v. Bennett, 37 Iowa 15 (1873). 
6 Vincent v. Brant, 101 l\iich. 60, 59 N.W. 421 (1894). 
7 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 26-1,121 (Reissue 1948) provides, "The muncipal 
court shall have power to inquire, in the manner hereinafter directed, as 
well against those who make unlawful and forcible entry into lands and 
tenements, and detain the same, as against those who, having a lawful 
and peaceable entry into lands or tenements, unlawfully and by force hold 
the same. If it is found, upon such inquiry, that an unlawful and forcible 
entry has been made, and that the same lands or tenements- are held by 
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defendant is unlawfully detaining possession from him. The 
remedy is available even though the defendant has not expelled 
the plaintiff by force, and it is immaterial that the plaintiff has 
never been in possession.8 A lessee having the right to possession 
is therefore a proper party to maintain the statutory action for 
unlawful detainer against any person unlawfully detaining the 
premises.9 The forcible entry and detainer statute provides a 
summary remedy since the ordinary rules of pleading and prac-
tice which govern the action of statutory ejectment in the district 
court10 do not apply.11 
C. INJUNCTION 
The equitable remedy of injunction cannot be used merely to 
gain possession. It is axiomatic in equity jurisprudence that this 
remedy cannot be pursued solely to try title or to transfer pos-
session of real property from the wrongful occupier to the lessee, 
when the lessee has an adequate remedy at law.12 However, the 
court will frequently deliver possession as auxiliary to other re-
lief.13 
II. Damages For Loss Of Possession 
A. AGAINST THE LESSOR 
There are two general rules concerning the duty of a lessor 
to put the tenant in possession. Under the socalled "American 
rule" there is no implied covenant by the lessor to put the lessee 
in possession as against a third party occupant. The lessor im-
pliedly covenants only that possession shall not be withheld by 
one having a paramount title.14 The other line of authority fol-
lowing the "English rule" holds that the lessor impliedly covenants 
that the premises shall be both legally and actually open to the 
lessee on the day the term begins.15 Nebraska follows the "Eng-
force, or that the same, after a lawful entry, are held unlawfully, then 
the court shall cause the party complaining to have restitution thereof." 
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-1401 (Reissue 1948) (similar jurisdiction given to 
justices of the peace). 
s Gregory v. Pribeno, 143 Neb. 379, 9 N.W.2d 485 (1943). 
9 Gregory v. Pribeno, 143 Neb. 379, 9 N.W.2d 485 (1943); Brown v. 
Feagins, 37 Neb. 256, 55 N.W. 1048 (1893). 
10 See note 2 supra. 
11 Sporer v. Herlick, 158 Neb. 644, 64 N.W.2d 342 (1954). 
12 Hollinrake v. Neeland, 94 Neb. 530. 143 N.W. 809 (1913). 
13 See Note, 12 A.L.R.2d 1186, 1201 (1950). 
14 See Note, 70 A.L.R. 141, 151 (1931). 
lu Ibid. . 
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lish rule" that the lessor has a duty to oust anyone in wrongful 
possession of the premises when the lessee's term begins.1'3 
The measure of general damages for a breach of the implied 
covenant to put the lessee in possession is the excess, if any, of 
the rental value of the premises for the term demised over the 
rent agreed upon in the lease.17 
The lessee may also recover special damages that can be 
shown to have necessarily resulted from the breach of the agree-
ment.18 Special damages have been awarded for the extra costs 
of maintaining a family and loss of time during pendency of 
forcible detainer proceedings ;19 expenses incurred in leasing other 
land and the added cost of moving thereto ;20 liability to sub-
lessees, and hiring of an architect to make plans for altering pre-
mises ;21 and salaries of employees and e:i...'tra expense in handling 
merchandise.22 In leases of business property, loss of profits has 
been held to be a proper element of damages when foreseeable 
and capable of being measured with reasonable certainty.23 Many 
decisions have denied recovery of "lost profits" for the reason 
that if the business of the lessee is not an established one, the 
loss is conjectural.24 In contrast to the situation with respect to 
leases of business property, it is generally held under leases of 
farm lands that the lessee is entitled to recover as special dam-
ages the loss of any profits he might have earned from the land.21 
Nebraska courts have refused to award damages for loss of farm 
profits to a lessee denied possession because the profits are too 
speculative.26 
16 Herpolsheimer v. Christopher, 76 Neb. 352, 107 N.W. 382. aff'd on 
rehearing, 76 Neb. 355, 111 N.W. 359 (1907). 
17 Sibert v. Hostick, 91 Neb. 255, 135 N.W. 1054 (1912); Herpolsheimer 
v. Christopher, 76 Neb. 355. 111 N.W. 359 (1907); Shutt v. Lockner, 77 
Neb. 397, 109 N.W. 383 (1906). If the rent reserved in the lease were 
$1000 and the rental value of the premises for the term demised were 
found to be $1500, then the damages would be $500. The rental value is 
sometimes expressed as the "fair value of the use of the premises.'' 
18 Ibid. 
19 Herpolsheimer v. Christopher. 76 Neb. 355, 111 N.W. 359 (1907). 
20 Sibert v. Hostick, 91 Neb. 255, 135 N.W. 1054 (1912). 
21 Darling Shops Inc. of Tennessee v. Brack. 95 F.2d 135 (8th Cir. 1938). 
22 Bennett v. Weinberger, 160 La. 1001, 107 So. 780 (1926). 
23 See Note, 104 A.L.R. 129, 157 (1936). 
24Alexander v. Bishop, 59 Iowa 572, 13 N.W. 714 (1882); Walter Box 
Co. v. Blackburn, 157 S.W. 220 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913). 
25 Stewart v. Murphy, 95 Kan. 421, 148 Pac. 609 (1915). 
26 Jarman v. Sexton, 130 Neb. 453, 264 N.W. 305 (1936); Philips v. 
Bossung, 108 Neb. 658, 189 N.W. 172 (1922}; Shutt v. Lockner, 77 Neb. 
397, 109 N.W. 383 (1906). 
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B. DAMAGES AGAINST THE OCCUPIER 
( 1) Trespass 
The action for direct trespass to land, in the nature of the 
common law action of trespass qua.re clausum fregit, may be main-
tained by a person in possession of the land at the time of a wrong-
ful entry regardless of the nature of his holding. Thus it may 
be maintained by any tenant of land against one who shows no 
title or other right superior to his own. It is the general rule 
that as against any third person who trespasses on his possession, 
the lessee has a right to a direct suit27 and it is immaterial (ex-
cept as to the measure of damages) whether the plaintiff held 
under a lease, or at will, or even at sufferance.28 The basis of 
the action is the injury to his right of possession. But in order 
to maintain an action of trespass the plaintiff must have been in 
possession of the land at the time of the trespass.29 The require-
ment of possession may in some circumstances be satisfied by a 
constructive possession.30 A lessee who has never been in posses-
sion, however, cannot create even a constructive possession in 
the face of an actual possession by the wrongful occupier.31 
Thus, the requirement of possession-actual or constructive-ap-
pears to make it impossible for a lessee never in possession to 
obtain damages in trespass from a person in actual possession of 
the premises. 
No Nebraska cases have been found which concern a lessee 
who was not in possession, and who recovered against a trespasser. 
The rule in Nebraska seems to be in accord with the general 
rule that in order to maintain an action of trespass to land a 
plaintiff who is not the owner of the land must have been in 
possession at the time the acts complained of were committed.32 
If it were possible for the lessee out of possession to bring an 
action of trespass against the occupier, presumably the plaintiff 
21 Kellogg v. King, 114 Cal. 378, 46 Pac. 166 (1896); Garrett v. Sewell, 
95 Ala. 456, 10 So. 226 (1891). 
2" See Note, 12 A.L.R.2d 1186, 1203 (1950). 
2f• Boulton v. Telfer, 52 Idaho 185, 12 P.2d 767 (1932); Munsey v. 
Hanly, 102 1\Ie. 423, 67 Atl. 217 (1907); Clay v. City of St. Albans, 43 
W. Va. 539, 27 S.E. 368 (1897). 
30 First Nat'l Bank of Albuquerque v. Town of Tome, 23 N.l\I. 255, 167 
Pac. 733 (1917); Callagan v. American Trust and Saving Bank, 196 Ill. 
App. 102 (1915). 
31 Littleton v. Roberts, 181 s.c. 303, 187 S.E. 349 (1936); Kossen v. 
Rhoades, 272 Pa. 75, 116 Atl. 56 (1922). 
32 Hanlon v. Union Pacific Ry., 40 Neb. 52, 58 N.W. 590 (1894}; Chicago 
R. I. & P. Ry. v. Shepherd, 39 Neb. 523, 58 N.W. 189 (1894); Nelson v. 
Jenkins, 42 Neb. 133, 60 N.W. 311 (1894) 
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would be entitled to recover such an amount as would compensate 
him for the loss which he sustained in consequence of the def end-
ant's wrongful act.33 
(2) Trespass for Mesne Profits 
Mesne profits are the pecuniary benefits received by one who 
dispossesses the owner of land between the wrongful entry and 
the restoration of possession. An action for mesne profits springs 
from a trespass and tortious holding. It is an emanation from 
the action of ejectment and can be brought after the right of 
possession of the plaintiff has been established by a judgment in 
ejectment. The damages for the use of the property while a 
tresspass is continued thereon is measured by the reasonable rental 
value of the property. 
The Nebraska statutes have substituted for the action of 
trespass for mesne profits an action which is described as a claim 
for damages for the withholding of real property, and for the 
rents and profits.34 The statute provides that claims to recover 
real property, with or without damages for the withholding there-
of, may be united in one petition in an action for the loss of rents 
and profits of the real property.a;; An action for ejectment and 
an action for rents and profits may be joined.36 A lessee who has 
never been in possession can bring the action of ejectment37 and 
can recover the rents and profits enjoyed by a wrongful occupier 
during the lessee's term. 
(3) Interference with Right of Contract 
A recent Ohio case presents a novel approach which may be 
available to the lessee.38 In this case the lessee brought an action 
against the former tenant to recover damages sustained by rea-
son of his wrongful holding over and refusal to vacate the pre-
mises which had been leased by the owner to the lessee. It was 
held that the lessee had a cause of action ex delicto for wrongful 
interference with the contractual relationship and could recover 
such damages which were the natural result of the tenant's wrong-
33 Shiverick v. R.J. Gunning Co., 58 Neb. 29, 78 N.W. 460, rev'd on 
rehearing, 59 Neb. 73, 80 N.W. 264 (1899). 
34 Fletcher v. Brown, 35 Neb. 660, 53 N.W. 577 (1892); Harral v. 
Gray, 12 Neb. 543, 11 N.W. 851 (1882). 
au Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-701 (Reissue 1948). 
36 See note 34 supra. 
37 Dale v. Hunneman, 12 Neb. 221, 59 N.W. 421 (1894). 
38 Reichman v. Drake, 89 Ohio App. 222, 100 N.E.2d 533 (1951). 
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ful acts. The court relied on Section 766 of the Restatement of 
Torts39 which states: 
.... one who, without privilege to do so, induces or otherwise 
purposely causes a third person not to (a) perform a contract 
with another, or (b) to enter into or continue a business relation 
with another is liable to the other for the harm caused thereby. 
The court applied this section by reasoning that the old ten-
ant interfered with the contractual relations between the plaintiff 
and the landlord in that it became impossible for the lessor to 
place the lessee in possession on the commencement date of the 
term as contemplated by the parties. In measuring damages the 
court quoted the following rule: 
As a general rule the reasonable and necessary expenses incurred 
in good faith, in anticipation of performance, or in part per-
formance, of a contract, may be recovered as a part of the dam-
ages for its breach, especially where the breach consists in pre-
venting performance.40 
Nebraska has never applied the interference-with-the-right-
of-contract rule in a similar situation. Because of the difficulty 
in bringing an action of trespass quare clausinn fregit and the 
possible limitations regarding special damages in an action for 
rents and profits a lessee out of possession might use this theory 
as an alternative. The fact that Nebraska places an implied co-
venant on the lessor to put the lessee in possession would indicate 
that the court tends to favor the lessee's rights. This adds weight 
to the possibility that the Nebraska courts would accept the inter-
ference with the right of contract theory. 
Conclusion 
The type of remedy to which the lessee will resort will de-
pend on his particular situation and need for the premises. Such 
factors as the availability of other similar premises, seriousness 
of delay during pendency of the suit and difficulty of moving 
from one premise to another will influence his decision as to 
whether he should bring action against the lessor or the occupier 
and the type of action to bring. 
Though Nebraska follows the rule that the lessor impliedly 
covenants to put the lessee in possession, the lessee should stipu-
late in the lease, if he is in position to do so, that the lessor will 
give actual possession free of third parties. 
Hal Bauer, '56 
39 Restatement, Torts § 766 (1939). 
40 15 Am. Jur. 545. See Guerini Stone Co. v. Carlin Contr. Co., 248 
U.S. 334 (1919). 
